

~~SECRET~~The Near East and North Africa~~Communist capabilities~~ <sup>aspirations and</sup> ~~in~~ Syria, ~~and~~ Israel, ~~or~~ among Palestinian Arabs

The present pro-Soviet trend in Syria, the reported presence of Soviet military experts and technicians in Syria and the consequent improvement in the status of the Syrian CP constitute the greatest sources of threats of sabotage for the neighboring states of ~~Jordan~~ Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Communists of these areas will probably continue to commit acts of terrorist nature as operatives of non-Communist agencies or groups. Particularly dangerous ~~as a threat~~ is the extensive infiltration of Communists into the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau and other ~~subordinate~~ units or subordinate institutions of the Syrian Army.

The existence of exploitable issues--such as the ~~impoverished~~ <sup>plight of</sup> Palestinian refugees in ~~Jordan~~ <sup>Jordan</sup>--~~con~~tributes to the continuous nature of the threat. Communist and pro-Communist elements among the refugees ~~constitute~~ constitute a source of personnel for Communist sabotage missions and training programs. These men are trained in Syria and are clandestinely returned to Jordan. In a moment of economic or political crisis a coordinated, widespread sabotage campaign conceivably could occur in the states adjacent to Syria.

In Egypt, the threat of Communist sabotage is presently slight in view of Nasr's ~~anti-West~~ <sup>anti-West</sup> policy--a policy which ~~has~~ <sup>severely</sup> ~~hampers~~ Soviet

~~approval~~. In view of the disrupted status of the Tudeh Party of Iran,

the greatest threat of sabotage in this area ~~would~~ <sup>(for the present future is likely to be the direct action of</sup> come from a Soviet ~~agent~~ <sup>intelligence agents</sup>. The ~~latter~~ <sup>Soviet services</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>would</sup> probably not initiate such action unless an outbreak

of war ~~is~~ <sup>were</sup> imminent. ~~In the Near East, the Communists~~

~~In Ceylon~~, <sup>was</sup> ~~although there is evidence of organizational and material preparation for an eventual~~ <sup>in mid-1957</sup> ~~sabotage~~ <sup>violent</sup> action, this will probably not be undertaken

in the near future in view of the CP's present policy to support the govern-

ment. The Moscow-oriented ~~CP~~ <sup>Communist Party of Ceylon</sup> probably ~~has~~ <sup>is</sup> broader popular support and a

greater ability to ~~coordinate and control~~ <sup>dominate</sup> the other Communist parties of

Ceylon. ~~Aggressive action is likely only if current operations seem likely to fail.~~ <sup>Aggressive action is likely only if current operations seem likely to fail.</sup>

~~before initiating aggressive action.~~ In other Near and Middle Eastern areas the CP's are too weak to ~~initiate~~ <sup>carry out</sup> anything but isolated ~~acts~~ <sup>acts</sup> of industrial or other sabotage.

(in Egypt, Libya, and Morocco)

It is possible ~~however~~ <sup>that</sup> demonstrations and violence directed against US installations might be generated & exploited in the event of a significant increase in US-Egyptian ~~disension~~ <sup>disension</sup>. Provocative acts which can

~~or if~~ <sup>or if</sup> Egypt ~~showed signs of~~ <sup>seeking a rapprochement with the West.</sup>

Covert <sup>sections</sup> apparatus of the Algerian CP and Communist fractions within the <sup>Algerian unions</sup> ~~CGT~~ will probably continue to provide support for the FLN by organizing and executing sabotage, by acquiring or preparing explosives for the FLN and other ~~forms~~ similar forms of aid. <sup>P</sup>The Communist-led nationalist movement in the Cameroons, the Union des Populations Cameroons (UPC), will probably continue its ~~x~~ terrorist campaign to weaken the French colonial authorities and to try to gain control over the <sup>entire</sup> ~~independent~~ nationalist movement.

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~